和平、危机与战争运用网络中心战

Effects Based OperationsApplying Network Centric Warfare in Peace,Crisis,and WarEdward A.SmithInformation Age Transformation SeriesTable of ContentsAcknowledgments.viiPreface .ixExecutive Summary.xiiiIntroduction .xxiChapter 1.Why Effects-Based Operations?Military Operations in a New Security Environment .1Chapter 2.Network-Centric Operations:The Starting Point .59Chapter 3.What Are Effects-Based Operations?.103Chapter 4.Shaping Behavior:Operations in theCognitive Domain.157Chapter 5.The Rules of the Game:Putting Effects-Based Operations into a Real-World Context .193Chapter 6.The Challenge of Complexity.231Chapter 7.From Dealing with Complexity ToExploiting It .295Chapter 8.Dynamic Effects-Based Operations:TheChallenge of Effects Assessment and Feedback .353Chapter 9.Effects Beyond Combat:Deterrence and Reassurance.409Chapter 10.Putting the Pieces Together:An Operational Example .445iChapter 11.Network-Centric Contributions to Effects-Based Operations:Options,Agility,Coordination,and Knowledge Mobilization .501Bibliography .547About the Author .557Catalog of CCRP Publications.CAT-1iiList of FiguresFigure 1.Forward Defense .8Figure 2.Symmetry of Means and Will=Symmetric Warfare .30Figure 3.Asymmetry of Means and Will .33Figure 4.Asymmetric Conflict .34Figure 5.Probability Equation .39Figure 6.Comparing the Two Approaches .43Figure 7.Self-Synchronization andSpeed of Command .78Figure 8.The OODA Cycle .80Figure 9.Speed of Command .82Figure 10.Synchronizing OODA Cycles toMass Effects .86Figure 11.Coordinated AttackThen What?.88Figure 12.Coalition Operations:International Self-Synchronization.89Figure 13.OODA Cycle.118Figure 14.Interaction Between OODA Cycles .119Figure 15.Battle of Midway(June 1942).121Figure 16.How?Out of Phase .125Figure 17.Compression of Time.128Figure 18.Multiple Overlapping Cycles.129Figure 19.How?Time Compression+Multiplying Cycles .131Figure 20.Result:Lock Out.132Figure 21.Defining the Edge of Chaos.136Figure 22.Defining the Edge of Chaos.138iiiFigure 23.Operations on the Edge of Chaos .140Figure 24.Battle of Trafalgar(1805).142Figure 25.Intersecting Edges of Chaos .147Figure 26.Edge of Chaos Three Axes.149Figure 27.Three Domains of Conflict .161Figure 28.Operations in the Physical Domain .162Figure 29.Operations in the Information Domain.165Figure 30.Operations in the Information Domain.168Figure 31.Operations in the Cognitive Domain .175Figure 32.Sensemaking and Decisionmaking .178Figure 33.Reactions in the Physical Domain .180Figure 34.Action-Reaction Cycle .183Figure 35.The Middle East .197Figure 36.Basic Building Block:Action-Reaction Cycle .207Figure 37.Action-Reaction Cycle .224Figure 38.From Action to Observer .235Figure 39.Observable Attributes of Physical Actions.236Figure 40.Kinds of Effects .257Figure 41.Combining Effects .268Figure 42.Tactical Level Balance of Effects .269Figure 43.Operational Level Balance of Effects.270Figure 44.Military-Strategic Level Balance of Effects .271Figure 45.Geo-Strategic Level Balance of Effects .273Figure 46.From Actions to Effects .276Figure 47.Unity of Effect.283Figure 48.Relative Weight of Effort .285Figure 49.Different Actions,Different Timelines .286ivvFigure 50.Coordination Requirements:Planned vs.Self-Synchronization .288Figure 51.Creation of Overall Effect.299Figure 52.Effects Cascades:Physical Action to Direct Physical Effect.313Figure 53.Effects Cascades:First Cascade of Indirect Effects .313Figure 54.Effects Cascades:Second Cascade of Indirect Physical Effects .313Figure 55.Effects Cascades:Cascade of Indirect Psychological Effects.315Figure 56.Effects Cascades:Derivative Cascades of Indirect Psychological Effects.317Figure 57.Effects Cascades:Bounding Complexity by Pruning .325Figure 58.Effects Cascades:Pruning Psychological Effects .329Figure 59.Effects Nesting .333Figure 60.Effects Nesting:Multiple Overlapping Nests .335Figure 61.Coalition Nesting .339Figure 62.The Cognitive Cycle.387Figure 63.What is Observable?.389Figure 64.How Do We Observe?.394Figure 65.Deterrence,Reassurance,and theCognitive Process .417Figure 66.Libyan Crisis(1986).449Figure 67.Nesting:Tactical Level .456Figure 68.Attain Document I and II(Libya 1986).459Figure 69.Nesting:Operational Level.461Figure 70.Nesting:Military-Strategic Level.471Figure 71.Different Actions,Different Timelines .477Figure 72.Effects Nesting .479Figure 73.Freedom of Navigation Operations(Libya 1987).507Figure 74.Shared Situational Awareness .510Figure 75.Communities of Expertise:Libya(1986-7).518Figure 76.“Context”in the Cognitive Domain.523viAcknowledgmentsIn writing this book,I was privileged to be able todraw upon the work of the Information SuperiorityWorking Group(ISWG)sponsored by the Office ofthe Secretary of Defense,upon the“SensemakingWorkshop”sponsored by the ISWG and theAmerican Institute for Aeronautics and Astronautics,and the“Effects-Based Operations Workshop”ofJanuary 2002,in all of which I participated.Theideas presented also draw upon my own lessonslearned from direct