2022年第三届“LSCAT杯”江苏省笔译大赛 竞赛试题英译汉稿.docx

本文格式为Word版，下载可任意编辑2022年第三届“LSCAT杯”江苏省笔译大赛 竞赛试题英译汉稿 Ever since Darwin came up with the theory of natural selection, there has been question — in some quarters, a worry — about whether human beings remain in any meaningful sense unique creatures. When it comes to things like cognition and language, we operate at far higher levels than other animals do. But are these merely differences of degree, as Darwin’s theory suggests, rather than of kind? Should the human faculties that once led us to see ourselves as ontologically special — our capacity for moral conduct, our ability to make choices on the basis of reasons — be understood instead as marking the far end of a continuous spectrum of animal all of which can be explained in light of DNA and the evolutionary history that shaped it? 自从达尔文提出自然选择学说，有些人就一向不解，甚至烦扰人类是否从任何层面来说都是一种与众不同的动物。

我们在认知和语言等方面比其他动物拥有更高的水平，但就像达尔文理论里所说的，这些仅仅是程度上的差异而非种类的差异吗？有些才能让我们曾经认为人类在本质上是更加的，譬如符合道德的行为才能和基于理性的选择才能，但这些人类才能莫非就能因此被理解成动物连续行为的终端标志吗？这些动物行为的不同实际上可以从DNA差异和历史进化的观点来解释 For a great many scientists and science-minded thinkers, the answer is an unequivocal yes. A human being is just a very clever animal. If we do something that seems at first to defy biological principles (say, heroic self-sacrifice), it’s only a matter of time before some theory of sexual selection or population genetics will explain it. Everything we do is an expression of our animal character. Any other view of human nature is an exercise in magical thinking or sentimentalism. 对于大量科学家和拥有理性思维的人来说，答案是断定的。

人类只是一种分外聪明的动物假设我们最初做的事违背生物界规律（像英雄主义的自我牺牲），那用性选择理论或人口遗传学理论来解释该现象只是时间问题我们每个行为都能表达我们的动物性，其他有关人性的观点都是想象思维或理性思维的结果 Not so, the philosopher Roger Scruton says. In his finely written, compactly argued book On Human Nature (Princeton University), he sets out to defend human uniqueness — without denying that “human beings are animals, governed by the laws of biology.” His contention is that human beings are animals but also “persons,” by which he means “free, self-conscious, rational agents, obedient to reason and bound by the moral law.” Personhood, in this view, is not some extra thing to be placed supernaturally atop our organism selves. But neither is it something reducible to our biology. Rather, Scruton argues, our animal nature and our personhood are two distinct, contrasting aspects of us. One or the other comes into focus depending on what sort of questions we ask about ourselves. Science has much to say about one aspect, but not about the other. 哲学家罗杰·斯克鲁顿认为事实并非如此，在他用心创作和细致论述的《论人性》一书中，他着手驳斥人类的独特性，但并未否认人类是一种受生物界规律制约的动物。

他认为人类既有兽性，也有人性这里的人是指拥有自由行动，猛烈意识和理性思维，但同时也受理性和道德律法制约的个体从这方面来说，人格并非是安置于我们身体之上的某种超自然的额外之物，但是也不能被归纳到生物界斯克鲁顿认为，人类的动物本性和人性是截然不同的、彼此对立的两个属性哪一属性更凸显取决于我们问自己哪一类问题其中一个属性可以有好多科学依据，但另一属性却不然 Scruton offers an analogy. Consider a painting — let’s say, the Mona Lisa. It is a physical object composed entirely of physical things: lines and fields of paint applied to a canvas. If you look at the painting, you see those physical things. But you also see something else: an image of a woman with an enigmatic expression on her face. This image is not an extra thing added to the lines and fields of paint. At the same time, it is something “over and above” the paint: a likeness of Lisa Gherardini. While not every arrangement of paint gives rise to such images, those of a certain complexity do. Scruton is not suggesting that in those cases, some numinous entity — the image — is created; he is suggesting that a different way of seeing the lines and fields is available to us, a way of seeing that exposes us to a world beyond the one expressible by any purely physical description of paint. 斯克鲁顿做了一个类比。

我们一起来想想蒙娜丽莎这幅画这是一幅完全由物质要素组成的画作，在油画布上画线条和涂油漆留心研究这幅画，你会察觉这些物质要素，你也会有其他察觉，如一位面带微笑的女人形象这个形象并非是加条和涂料之上的额外之物，但同时它又像是超越画作自身之物，就像丽莎·格拉迪尼然而并非每幅画中的物质要素搭配在一起都能产生这样的形象，只有那些具有确定繁杂性的方可产生这样的效果斯克鲁顿并不赞同这种想法，当神秘的形象被创造出来时，他建议我们用另一种方法来对付这些线条和区域，这个方法就是使我们自己处于一个无法用任何简朴的绘画元素来描述的世界 Similarly, Scruton contends, personhood is an “emergent” property of a biological organism. The critical shift occurs when the organism is complex enough to become self-conscious, when it is capable of conceiving itself as an “I,” and of grasping that other like-minded organisms also conceive of themselves this way. This is the human equivalent of the moment when the image of Lisa Gherardini arises from Leonardo’s paint: A new way of understanding ourselves and others like us comes into view. We become “persons,” whose actions make sense in terms of things like reasons and obligations and free choice — a different order of explanation than biologists have recourse to （求助于，）when talking about instinctive animal behavior. Science can offer powerful accounts of the relations between organisms — between an “it” and an “it” — but it cannot capture the understanding of us as we understand each other: as between a “you” and an “I.” For Scruton, this marks a radical separation of us from the rest of the natural world. 。