欧盟、美国和亚洲-经济作为武器？（英）

Policy PaperThe EU,US and Asia.Economy as a Weapon?Filippo Fasulo Contributions by:Philippe Le CorreIlaria MazzoccoShino WatanabeTable of ContentsIN BRIEF 4WHATS AT STAKE 7ASIA TAKES THE LEAD(AND EUROPE LAGS BEHIND)7 1.What happened 7 2.Confrontation beyond competition 9 3.Confrontation on the rise(especially in key sectors)11 BOX 1-EUROPES CHINA-LITHUANIA MOMENT 12PLANS AND POLICIES 18 Industrial Plans in Europe and the US 18 European Union 18 United States 22 BOX 2-BIDENS DILEMMA:CAUGHT BETWEEN ENERGY TRANSITION AND STRATEGIC RISKS 25 Asian countries taking the lead in critical sectors 27 Taiwan 27 Japan 28 South Korea 29 India 31 Cooperation Beyond Competition 32 BOX 3-JAPANS INITIATIVE TO SECURE SUPPLY CHAINS AND ITS CHALLENGES 34EXPLORING OPTIONS 37NOTES 41The EU,US and Asia.Economy as a Weapon?|4In BriefIn the last decade China,under the leadership of Chinese Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping,experienced a double transition:it developed explicit plans to achieve technological and economic primacy and erased the already small possibility of adopting some form of liberal democratic political reforms in the near future.Rooted in previous policies,the game-changing plan for Chinas technological and industrial ambitions was Made in China 2025,released in 2015 and aimed at supporting domestic high-quality productions in ten emerging industries.At the same time,Xi Jinping centralized power and projected his leadership beyond the 10-year mandate of his predecessors.In addition,Xi Jinping abandoned Chinas traditional cautious stance on foreign policy to strongly call for Chinas return to its place in the world.The combination of the two industrial policies and Xi Jinpings Grand Strategy caused a strong reaction from the West and from Chinas neighboring countries.They at first promoted initiatives targeting Chinas technological rise accused to be unfair and predatory and then developed their own industrial plans.The pandemic and the war in Ukraine made clear to everyone that economic advantages might turn into a political option during confrontations.Indeed,since the beginning of Covid-19 the process to promote industrial plans to boost domestic industrial capacity in strategic sectors accelerated.Economic competition is linked to Great Power competition.Not being dependent on China became relevant once China started to be seen more as a challenger rather than an opportunity or,as the EU Commission put it:“a partner for cooperation and negotiation,an economic competitor and a systemic rival”.However,in the current geopolitical scenario competition between China and the West is not a zero-sum game,and other Asian countries might benefit from the new centrality of the Pacific and from economic relocations away from China.Moreover,Chinas neighboring countries are as worried as the West about excessive dependence on China and are even pushing(unsuccessfully so far)policies to promote decoupling and re-shoring from China.The economic competition to reduce dependence will be played mainly in the field of a few select strategic sectors such as semiconductors,batteries and critical materials.Semiconductors are arguably the most strategic one,not only for their economic values but for the fact that they hold a reverse dependence on China.Indeed,integrated circuits represent Chinas top imports as Beijings domestic production cannot meet its domestic demand,either quantitatively or qualitatively,and it is pushing investments to achieve autonomy in the near future.However,this goal is still far from being accomplished,and concurrently Taiwan is eager to maintain its leadership in the sector and expand its market share in the most technological niches.Moreover,this situation is further complicated by the rising geopolitical tensions between Taipei and Beijing(and the)over the PRCs one China policy.On the other hand,batteries are crucial Policy Paper for the automotive sector and China dominates the market,with serious implications for the future of the European automotive industry,which is pivoting towards electric cars and may thus become dependent on Chinas battery producers.Chinas advantage in the battery sector is not only technological,but also in terms of production of crucial materials mined in China.To address dependency issues on these three sectors,the EU,the US,Japan,South Korea and India have released plans specifically targeted to cut dependency in strategic sectors and to increase their market shares.In addition,they created alliances to support one another in the quest for reducing exposure to China.From the European point of view,the challenge posed by an excessive dependence is vital for the future of its industry and might condition its foreign policy,as the case of Russian energy supplies cut during the war in Ukraine demonstrates.However,the EUs concern should not only focus on achieving strategic autonomy in critical sectors,but also on preserving and gaining market shares.In this regard,the