《股权性质论文：制度背景、财务杠杆与企业投资》.docx

股权性质论文：制度背景、财务杠杆与企业投资【中文摘要】债务融资与投资支出的关系是财务理论的重要研究 课题之一传统财务理论认为负债融资与投资支出之间没有相关性， 不管企业的财务状况如何，只要企业具备良好的投资机会就可以筹集 到相应的资金满足其投资需要现代财务理论基于委托一代理理论和 信息不对称理论这两方面的考虑，认为财务杠杆水平会在一定程度上 影响企业投资支出关于债务融资对投资支出的影响作用，目前学术 界主要存在着两种不同的观点：一方面，一些学者认为负债会迫使企 业放弃净现值为正的投资项目，造成投资不足，表现为负债对正常投 资的抑制作用；另一方面，有的学者认为负债能够约束企业接受净现 值为负的投资项目，即负债具有相机治理作用，表现为负债对过度投 资的约束作用对于上述理论观点，国外学者的实证研究大多验证了 负债对过度投资具有约束作用，而国内学者的实证研究普遍不支持该 观点因此，进一步探索这一问题对于选择资本结构、规范企业投资 行为既有理论意义又有实践意义本文首先在文献梳理和理论分析的 基础上构建负债影响企业投资行为的理论分析框架 ；其次，从我国特 殊的制度背景出发，如上市公司大部分由国有企业改制而来， 企业的 债务主要来源于国有商业银行的贷款，政府对国有银行以及国有上市 公司起着直接或间接的干预作用，此外，我国各地区的市场化进程存 在明显的不一致，相比之下，东部沿海地区市场化进程较高等。

因此, 我们采用银行借款与总资产的比值作为衡量财务杠杆水平的变量， 分别从股权性质角度和市场化进程角度来考察财务杠杆与企业投资之 间的关系最后，实证研究中选取深、沪两市 2003年至2008年819 家上市公司的3576个样本观测值，在控制对投资有影响的托宾 Q值、 销售收入、白由现金流量等变量上的基础上， 主要得出以下两方面的研究结论一方面，就我国上市公司整体而言，企业的债务能够约束 企业的过度投资，即财务杠杆与企业投资支出负相关 相对于非国有上市公司而言，国有上市公司财务杠杆对投资支出的敏感性较弱 此外，相对于成长性高和业绩好的上市公司而言， 投资支出对财务杠杆的约束作用在成长性低和业绩差的上市公司中的较显著 进一步研究发现，上市公司的国有性质弱化了财务杠杆对投资支出在低成长和业 绩差的上市公司中约束作用另一方面，上市公司所在地区的市场化 程度越高，财务杠杆对投资支出的约束性作用较强进一步研究发现， 由市场化进程所导致的财务杠杆对企业投资支出的约束性作用在国 有企业中较弱本文的研究结论表明我国大部分上市公司存在着非效 率投资行为，债务并没有完全发挥其硬的约束作用英文摘要】A cental issue in finance is whether leverage affects investment poilcies.Neoclassic finance theory maintains that leverage is irrelevant with investment. A firm with good projects can grow no matter how its capital structure is ,because it can always find funding to invest.Considering the informational asymmetries andagency problems, modern finance theory accepts the view that leverage affectsinvestment policies. However, there are also two sides about this view. On one side, the researchers think a firm s debtinduces under-investment because leverage prevents a firm from raising funds to finance positive net persent value(NPV)projects.Namely,leverage restrains a firm s valuable investments. Onthe other side, the researchers think a firm s debt has a disciplinary role on over-investment, because leverage pervents a firm fromaccepting negative NPV porjects.Meanwhile,there are different empirical research condusions.Although foreign researchers find that leverageplays a disciplinary role, Chinese researchers almost don tfind debt s disciplinary role.Clarifying this point is important for choosing a firm s capital structure and investment poilcies.The essay firstly construst its thoretical analysis structure about debts affects corporate investment on the basis of omnibus literature and thoretical analysis;secondly,considering our special market background,such as most listed companied were oriented from state companies,corporate debts roots in state commercial banks,government plays an indirecr or direct role in state banks and state listed companies,forthermore, the process of marketization is apparent different accounting to various district of our country,the eastern littoral has the higher marketizational process.Therefore,we choose the ratio of bank loan to total assets as the variable to weigh the leverage,from ownership propertiy and the process of marketization aspects to examine the relation between leverage and corporateinvestment.At last,based on 3576 listed companies data from 2003 to 2008 which are from shanghai and shenzhen exchange, after controlling for the variables that influence a firm sinvestment such as Tobin s Q, sales income and cash,the essay obtains two major research findings as follows.For one thing,as far as our all listed companies to be concerned,the relation between leverage and corporate investment is negative.The negative relation between leverage and investment is weaker in firms with state ownership than in firms with non-state ownership.In addition,the negative relation between leverage and investment is stronger in firms with low growth opportunities and poor operating performance than in fims with high growth opportunities and good operating performance. Furthermore,the relationship between leverage and investment is weaker in firms with low growth opportunities and poor operating performance which have state ownership.For another,the he relationship between leverage and investment isweaker in firms with low market index than in firms with higher market index.The conclusion of this essay suggests that almost of listed companies in our countries exist non-efficencyinvestment ,the debts donot exert its functions.Therefore, the writer suggests that we should also add the flexility of debt to advance the efficient corporate investments.Meanwhile, the ” soft-budget ” should be altered.【关键词】股权性质市场化进程财务杠杆企业投资【英文关键词］ owershiop property the process of marketization leverage corporate investment【目录】制度背景、财务杠杆与企业投资 摘要5-6 Abstract 6 第一章导论8-24 1.1研究背景和意义8-10 1.1.1 研究背景8-9 1.1.2 研究意义9-10 1.2概念范畴界定10-12 1.3文献综述12-20 1.3.1国外研究综述14-16 1.3.2国内研究综述16-20 1.4研究方法、内容和论文框架20-22 1.4.1 研究方法20 1.4.2 研究内容和论文框架20-22 1.5本文的创新点22-24 第二章财务杠杆与公司投资行为的理论分析24-27 2.1基于信息不对称理论视角分析财务杠杆与公司投资行为的关系 24-25 2.2基于委托代理理论视角分析财务杠杆与公司投资行为的关系 25-27 2.2.1股东与。