绩效评估、经济增加值和管理行为外文翻译、中英对照、英汉互译.doc

嘉兴学院南湖学院外文文献翻译译文题　　目： 日本核泄漏事件前后我国渔业上市公司业绩变化研究 系 别：　　 商 学 系　 　 专 业：　 财 务 管 理　 班 级：　　财 务 N091 学 号：　2009451090926　 　　 　　　学生姓名： 一、外文原文原文一：Performance Evaluation, Economic Value AddedAnd Managerial BehaviourFor the past two decades many countries started transforming their economies from traditional protected ones to those of more liberalized, globalized and market driven. This period has also seen the economies becoming more knowledge oriented and Human Resources started assuming more prominence in the growth of the economies and businesses posing a greater challenge for companies to acquire and retain talented workforce (especially at the strategic & managerial levels).The knowledge economy also started witnessing the rapid rise of the agency problem-conflict of interest between managers and owners. So it is very essential to align the interests of the mangers and shareholders or at least reduce the difference between them. In this regard Economic Value Added has been seen as better alternative to the stock price and traditional performance measures.While successful EVA stories in the west are quite encouraging, Corporate India is slowly catching up the EVA adoption. Although not a panacea, EVA based compensation plans will drive managers employ a firm’s assets more productively and EVA should help reduce the difference in the interests of the managers and shareholders, if not perfectly align them.1. IntroductionFor the past two decades many countries started transforming their economies from traditional protected ones to those of more liberalized, globalised and market driven . This period has also seen the economies becoming more knowledge oriented and Human Resources started assuming more prominence in the growth of the economies and businesses. But this has also posed a greater challenge for companies to acquire and retain talented workforce (especially at the strategic & managerial levels). The knowledge economy also started witnessing the rapid rise of the agency problem- conflict of interest between managers and owners. The managers – in their role as the agents– are expected to act in the best interests of the shareholders (principals). Managers will act in shareholders’ interests only if they have right incentives. So it is very essential to align the interests of the mangers and shareholders or at least reduce the difference between them.So we need a measure that on one hand rightly measures the managerial performance so that he managers – with talent and greater mobility- can be suitably compensated (and hence retained) and on the other aligns the interests of the mangers and shareholders. For some time now Stock Price was thought to be an ideal measure achieving the above objectives. However stock price has many limitations. We shall discuss the pitfalls of stock price as a performance measure before evaluating some of the traditional performance measures and then introduce Economic Value Added as the right measure of managerial performance.2. Traditional Measures of Managerial PerformanceShareholders want the maximization of stock price (firm value). So can we measure the performance of a manager directly as reflected by the stock price-Reward managers when stock price goes up and punish them if stock prices behave otherwise? This approach has a major limitation. ‘Stock price is driven by so many factors that escape from the control of managers, making it an inefficient measure of the true influence of the mangers on firm’s value. ‘Changes in stock price-in the short run at least – are not always accurate gauze of management performance due to the presence of randomness and noise’ (Kang et al, 2002). Tying top management compensation to stock prices raises another difficult issue. The market value of a company’s shares reflects investors’ expectations. The stockholder return depends on how well the company performs relative to expectations’. Suppose a company announces the appointment of an outstanding new manager. The stock price leaps up in anticipation of improved performance. Henceforth, even if the new manager delivers exactly the good performance that investors expected, the stock will earn only a normal average rate of return. In this case a compensation scheme linked to the stock return would fail to recognize the manager’s special contribution. An ideal performance measure should ensure that the managers would bear all the consequences of their own actions, but are not exposed to the fluctuations over which they have no control. In search of such a metric–traditionally-companies are used to capture managerial performance and reward them through the operation based measures like Profits, EPS, ROCE and ROE. However these measures are not free from limitations. An appropriate performance measure should assess how managerial actions affect the firm value. For this to happen the performance measure must incorporate。