【精品文档】486关于进出口国际经济贸易保护壁垒有关的外文文献翻译成品：贸易自由化、反qing xiao和保障措施：来自印度关税改革的证据（中英文双语对照）.docx

此文档是毕业设计外文翻译成品（ 含英文原文+中文翻译），无需调整复杂的格式！下载之后直接可用，方便快捷！本文价格不贵,也就几十块钱！一辈子也就一次的事！外文标题：Trade liberalization, anti-dumping, and safeguards: Evidence from Indias tariff reform外文作者：Chad P. Bown，Patricia Tovar文献出处: Journal of Development Economics 96 (2018) 115–125 (如觉得年份太老，可改为近2年，毕竟很多毕业生都这样做)英文5538单词，35441字符(字符就是印刷符)，中文8858汉字如果字数多了，可自行删减，大多数学校都是要求选取外文的一部分内容进行翻译的Trade liberalization, anti-dumping, and safeguards: Evidence from Indias tariff reformAbstract：This paper is the first to use product-level data to examine empirically whether countries use anti-dumping and safeguard exceptions to unwind commitments to lower tariffs in the face of domestic political–economic pressure. We focus on the case of India, a country that underwent a major exogenous tariff reform program in the early 1990s and subsequently initiated substantial use of safeguard and anti-dumping import restrictions. We first estimate structural determinants of Indias import protection using the Grossman and Helpman (1994) model and provide evidence from its pre-reform tariff data of 1990 that is consistent with the theory. We then re- estimate the model on the Indian tariff data after the trade liberalization is complete and find that the model no longer fits, a result consistent with theory and evidence provided in other settings that Indias 1991–1992 IMF arrangement can be interpreted as resulting in an exogenous shock to Indias tariff policy. However, when we re- estimate the model on data from 2000–2002 that more completely reflects Indias cross-product variation in import protection by including both its post-reform tariffs and its additional non-tariff barriers of anti-dumping and safeguard import protection, the significance of the Grossman and Helpman model determinant estimates is restored. We interpret these combined results as evidence that India unwound its commitment to reduce tariffs through use of anti-dumping and safeguard protection in the face of political-economic pressure. The estimates are also economically important and provide one explanation for separate results in the literature that the magnitude of import reduction associated with Indias use of anti-dumping is similar to the initial import expansion associated with its tariff reform. Finally, we interpret the implications of our results for the burgeoning research literature examining the effects of liberalization on Indias micro-level development.Keywords:India，Tariff reform，Anti-dumping，Safeguards，Political economy1. IntroductionIndia undertook a substantial episode of unilateral trade liberalization beginning in 1991–1992, one in which it dramatically cut its import tariffs in a process that continued until 1997. Its import-weighted average tariff declined from 87.0% in 1990–1991 to 24.6% in 1996–1997. Before 1992, India had never resorted to using the “safeguard” exceptions embodied in many trade agreements, such as anti-dumping or a global safeguard, to implement import restrictions that are common alternatives to tariffs. By the period 1997–2002, however, India had transformed from a non-user to become the WTO systems most prolific user of these alternative, non-tariff barriers to trade. In the case of anti-dumping, the vast majority of Indian investigations resulted in the imposition of new import restrictions, and most of them remained in effect for five years or more. As Fig. 1 indicates, by 2002, India had enough new anti-dumping trade barriers in place to cover 132 different 6-digit Harmonized System tariff lines.Combined, the potential exogeneity of Indias import tariff cut and the fact that it had no history of using anti-dumping or safeguard trade restrictions before the liberalization episode make the Indian experience a relatively unique testing environment in which to examine whether there is a relationship between tariff liberalization and the subsequent imposition of these non-tariff barriers to trade. This paper introduces a new approach to examine empirically the extent to which India used anti-dumping and safeguard exceptions to unwind its commitment to lower tariffs in the face of domestic political–economic pressure. India is an excellent setting to test for this relationship for a number of reasons that we detail further in Section 2. Following the initiation of its tariff reform program in 1991, India transformed from being a non- user of policy exceptions such as anti-dumping and safeguards to becoming the WTO systems most frequent user (WTO, 2009a,b ) of both types of import restrictions over the next decade. Nevertheless, while the response to the Indian tariff reform program appears well timed with the subsequent rise in filings and implementation of these safeguards and anti-dumping policy exceptions, is there a product-level link? Fig. 2 illustrates suggestive evidence of the basic relationship between the relative sizes of the 1990s tariff cuts and subsequent anti-dumping use. The figure indicates tha。