公司治理中控制股东约束机制的研究.doc

独创性声明本人声明所呈交的学位论文是本人在导师指导下进行的研究工作和取得的研究成果,除了文中特别加以标注和致谢之处外,论文中不包含其他人已经发表或撰写过的研究成果,也不包含获得 西南政法大学 或其他教育机构的学位或证书而使用过的材料与我一同工作的同志对本研究所做的任何贡献均已在论文中作了明确的说明并表示了谢意32 / 32.学位论文作者签名：签字日期：年月日.学位论文版权使用授权书本学位论文作者完全了解 西南政法大学 有关保留、使用学位论文的规定特授权 西南政法大学 可以将学位论文的全部或部分内容编入有关数据库进行检索,并采用影印、缩印或扫描等复制手段保存、汇编以供查阅和借阅同意学校向国家有关部门或机构送交论文的复印件和电子文档〔保密的学位论文在解密后适用本授权说明.学位论文作者签名：导师签名：.签字日期：年月日签字日期：年月日.法 律 硕 士 专 业 学 位 论 文公司治理中控制股东约束机制研究The Study On The Constraint Mechanism Of ControllingShareholders In Corporate Governance.作 者 姓 名：指 导 教 师：张李杰燕.西南政法大学.Southwest University of Political Science and Law..内容摘要我国大部分股份公司,由于特殊的时代背景,普遍存在着控制股东。

控制股东作为公司中的资本多数派,掌握着公司的控制权他们在做出决定或进行其他行为时,本应从整个公司的利益出发,然而他们自身利益并非总是与公司利益一致控制股东完全可能仅仅为了达到对公司的控制权,而不考虑公司整体或者广大中小股东的利益在现实情况下,控制股东利用其优势地位侵害中小股东权益的现象屡见不鲜,最近闹得沸沸扬扬的国美控制权之争就是一个典型的案例控制股东的存在有其必然性,且在一定程度上须承认其存在的合理性,但是,考虑到当前中小股东权益易遭控制股东所侵害的现状,构建控制股东的约束机制尤为必要本文在引言中对国美控制权之争事件本身做了简要的分析,认为国美控制权之争是公司治理中存在的控制股东滥用控制权现象的一个缩影,构建控制股东的约束机制在当下具有深刻的现实意义本文共分为以下几个部分：第一部分是对控制股东的概述首先对控制股东的概念进行了界定,在此基础上,笔者肯定了控制股东存在的合理性,并作了简要的分析,接着详细论述了控制股东滥用控制权的危害,阐述了约束控制股东的必要性,从而引出下文对如何构建控制股东约束机制的讨论第二部分是从控制股东和中小股东相互制衡方面来构建控制股东的约束机制主要思路是鉴于控制股东在当前股份公司中的强势地位,通过限制控制股东权利以及赋予中小股东必要权利,使得双方力量处于均衡的状态,防止控制股东权利的滥用。

笔者主要从四个方面分别进行了论述,分别是控制股东承担诚信义务、完善股东表决权制度、赋予中小股东法定权利、中小股东的救济机制等第三部分是从完善公司治理结构方面来构建控制股东的约束机制笔者认为控制股东滥用控制权的行为在一定程度上暴露了目前我国公司治理结构上的缺陷,如独立董事不独立,监事会制度形同虚设等因此,笔者在本部分主要从完善独立董1.事制度和监事会制度两方面进行论述,通过公司治理结构的完善,强化对控制股东滥权行为的监督结语部分对全文进行了总结,笔者认为构建控制股东的约束机制是一项系统工程,而且是一个不断完善的过程,必须从我国的具体情况出发,探讨各种机制的有效结合,从而真正起到遏制控制股东滥权行为,维护中小股东权益的作用关键词：公司治理；控制股东；控制权；约束机制2.AbstractMost of China's joint-stock company,because of the special background, There isprevalence of controlling shareholders. Controlling shareholders as the company's capitalmajority, hold the control of the company. They make a decision or other act, not fromthe interests of the entire company, but pursue their own interests. Controllingshareholders is entirely possible that just in order to achieve control of the company,regardless of the interests of the company . In reality,the controlling shareholders to useits dominant position against the interests of minority shareholders are commonoccurrences. GuoMei battle for control is a typical case.Therefore, at present, thecontrolling shareholder of the existence of inevitability, we must admit a certain extent,the rationalityof its existence. However, considering the small and medium shareholders'equityvulnerable to the controlling shareholder abuse, the establishmentof the controllingshareholders of the restraint mechanism is particularly necessary.In the introduction, I believe that GuoMei's battle for control of only a microcosm ofthe controlling shareholder abuse,building a the restraint mechanism for controllingshareholder has profound practical significance in the present.The full text is divided into the following sections:The first part is an overview of the controlling shareholders.The first is the conceptof controlling shareholders to .On this basis, I first confirmed the rationality of theexistence of controlling shareholders and made a brief analysis, then discusses thehazards of controlling shareholder abuse, explained the necessityof constraintscontrolling shareholders' rights, which leads to the discussion below on how to build acontrolling shareholder constraint mechanism.The second part is to build the constraint mechanism of controlling shareholdersfrom the controlling shareholders and minority shareholders of mutual checks andbalances . The main idea is that in view of the strong position of controlling shareholdersin stock companies, by restricting the control of shareholders' rights and to give minorityshareholders the necessary rights, ultimately, the strength of both sides is in a balancedstate,to prevent the abuse of the controlling shareholders' rights.1.The third part is to build the constraint mechanism of the controlling shareholdersfrom improving the corporate governance structure.I thinks that the controllingshareholders to abuse the control power has exposed China's corporate governancestructure defects, such as independent directors are not independent,the board ofsupervisors system does not work. Therefore, this part is mainly discussed from theimprovement of the system of independent directors and board of supervisors system ,through the improvement of corporate governance, strengthen the controllingshareholders abuse of supervision.The conclusion part summarizes the full thesis, I thinks that the construction of thecontrolling shareholders restriction mechanism is a system project, but also a continuousimprovement process, should To investigate the mechanism of various effectivecombination from our country 's specific conditions, thus truly to curb the controllings。