外文翻译-银行治理监管和风险承担.docx

外文翻译原文1Bank Governance? Regulation and Risk TakingThis paper conducts the first empirical assessment of theories concerning risk taking by banks, their ownership structures, and national bank regulations. We focus on conflicts between bank managers and owners over risk, and we show that bank risk taking varies positively with the comparative power of shareholders within the corporate governance structure of each bank. Moreover, we show that the relation between bank risk and capital regulations, deposit insurance policies, and restrictions on bank activities depends critically on each bank's ownership structure, such that the actual sign of the marginal effect of regulation on risk varies with ownership concentration. These findings show that the same regulation has different effects on bank risk taking depending on the bank's corporate governance structure.IntroductionPolicy considerations motivate this research. As emphasized by Bernanke(1983), Calomiris and Mason(1997, 2003a, b), Keeley (1990), and recent financial turmoil, the risk taking behavior of banks affects financial and economic fragility. In turn, international and national agencies propose an array of regulations to shape bank risk. Yet, researchers have not assessed how standard corporate governance mechanisms, such as ownership structure, interact with national regulations in shaping the risk taking behavior of individual banks. This gap is surprising because standard agency theories suggest that ownership structure influences corporate risk taking (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; John, Litov, and Yeung, 2008). This gap is also potentially serious from a policy perspective. The same regulations could have different effects on bank risk taking depending on the comparative power of shareholders within the ownership structure of each bank. Changes in policies toward bank ownership, such as allowing private equity groups to invest in the channels through which financial intermediaries exert an influence on the real economy (if at all)? What are the implications for monetary policy?Banks and other financial intermediaries borrow in order to lend. Since the loans offered by banks tend to be of longer maturity than the liabilities that fund those loans, the term spread is indicative of the marginal profitability of an extra dollar of loans on intermediaries9 balance sheets. The net interest margin (NIM) of the bank is the difference between the total interest income on the asset side of its balance sheet and the interest expense on the liabilities side of its balance sheet. Whereas the term spread indicates the profitability of the marginal loan that is added to the balance sheet, the NIM is an average concept that applies to the stock of all loans and liabilities on the balance sheet.In this framework, financial intermediaries drive the financial cycle through their influence on the determination of the price of risk. Quantity variables - particularly the components of financial intermediary balance sheets - emerge as important economic indicators due to their role in reflecting the risk capacity of banking sector and hence on the marginal real project that receives funding. In this way, the banking sector plays a key role in determining the level of real activity. Ironically, our findings have some points of contact with the older theme in monetary economics of keeping track of the money stock at a time when it has fallen out of favor among monetary economists. The common theme between our framework and the older literature is that the money stock is a balance sheet aggregate of the financial sector. Our approach suggests that broader balance sheet aggregates such as total assets and leverage are the relevant financial intermediary variables to incorporate into macroeconomic analysis.CONCLUDING REMARKSWe conclude with some implications of our findings for the conduct of monetary policy. Our emphasis on the role of balance sheet aggregates of financial intermediaries leads to policy prescriptions that bear a superficial similarity to an older tradition in monetary economics that emphasized the money stock as a pivotal quantity in monetary policy. The older monetarist tradition emphasized the stock of money because of the supposed direct link between the money stock and real expenditures through the portfolio adjustment of individual consumers who rebalance their portfolios consisting of money and real goods. Monetary aggregates had fallen from favor in the conduct of monetary policy mainly as a backlash against the older monetarist line (see Friedman, 1988).In this chapter, we have focused on balance sheet aggregates of financial intermediaries, but the rationale is quite different from the older monetarist literature. Our approach has been to emphasize the role of intermediary balance sheets as a determinant for the risk appetite ruling in the economy, and how monetary policy can affect the growth of intermediary balance sheets. Alth。