基于银行、一般债权人行为能力的最优债务结构研究.pdf

华中科技大学博士学位论文基于银行、一般债权人行为能力的最优债务结构研究姓名：杜育华申请学位级别：博士专业：管理科学与工程指导教师：张子刚;欧阳明德20070511IV摘摘 要要 基于银行和一般债权人在谈判、监督、争夺方面的行为能力差异，运用博弈论的分析方法，从道德风险的角度，研究了公司债务融资中两个重要的理论和现实问题： 一是公司应该选择银行贷款还是债券融资； 二是当公司进行混合融资时，如何在一般债权人和银行之间分配优先权，即谁应该是优先债权人 论文首次将破产成本和清算成本的差异引入到企业债务融资决策中破产成本不仅包括清算成本，还包括债权人之间的协调成本债券融资由于存在破产威胁虽然能够最大限度地降低公司蓄意拖欠风险，但同时又带来了高昂的破产成本 所以， 高质量公司应该选择债券融资， 低质量的公司应该选择银行拥有短期、优先债权，一般债权人只拥有次级、长期债权的混合融资结构论文还从资产互补性的角度印证了破产成本显著高于清算成本以及高质量公司应该选择债券融资的结论在资产互补性条件下，债券融资使得分散的债权人要价能力提高，高的要价能力一方面降低公司蓄意拖欠风险，但另一方面损害资产清算价值 银行的监督功能为公司利用银行融资带来两个方面的问题：一是“锁定”效应——银行“剥削”； 二是银行清算威胁的可置信性。

前者是银行知道项目前景光明，银行可能会威胁清算，获得“信息租金”后者是即使银行知道项目前景暗淡，也没有动力清算 论文首次运用动态博弈的分析方法研究了由于银行监督所带来的锁定效应——银行“剥削”的存在性问题在外部锁定的条件下，当公司的谈判能力弱（银行谈判能力强）时存在“剥削”，反之，则不存在在内部锁定的条件下，银行总能“剥削”公司如果存在银行剥削，则应该在混合融资中赋予一般债权人优先权，限制银行能够抽取的信息租金如果不存在银行“剥削”，其监督则带来另外一个问题——清算威胁的可置信性在银行融资的基础上，引入债券融资，降低银行的投资水平， 并且赋予银行优先权， 可以保持银行清算威胁的可置信性，降低公司道德风险 当公司陷入财务困境时，公司价值在债权人之间分配有两种形式：一是非正式破产（游说费用由债权人承担） ；二是正式破产（游说或诉讼费由公司承担） V论文运用争夺理论，首次分析了非正式破产中银行和一般债权人之间的争夺博弈，比较正式了破产和非正式破产的总争夺成本要使争夺成本最小，应该不仅将强者（银行）置于强的争夺地位（优先地位） ，还应该让公司承担争夺成本结论解释了在正式破产中，法院规定破产成本从公司价值中抵扣的合理性。

关键词：关键词：破产成本 谈判能力 锁定效应 清算威胁可置信性 游说/诉讼成本 VIAbstract According to the different abilities of bargaining, monitoring and contest between the bank and the common creditors and from the perspective of moral hazard, the paper study two important theoretical and realistic problems in corporate financing with debt with game analysis technology: The one is how the corporate make the best choice between bank loans and bonds; the other is how to allocate the priority between the bank and the common creditor when the corporate decide to borrow from both of them, i.e. who should be the senior. The paper believes that the difference between the bankruptcy costs and the liquidation costs have influences on the corporate financing decision. The former not only include the latter, but also include the coordination costs among the common creditors. Financing with bonds can deter strategic default due to the bankruptcy threat, but it brings high bankruptcy costs. Therefore, the high quality firms should choose bonds finance; the poor quality firms should choose mixed finance with the bank owning senior and short-term debt, the common creditor only possessing junior and long-term debt. In order to support the arguments that the bankruptcy costs is more expensive than the liquidation costs significantly and the high quality corporate should finance with bonds, the paper study optimal debt structure when the firm’s assets are worth more combined than separated. Considering the assets’ complementarities, the diffused common creditors can increase their bargaining power. Although the high bargaining power can deter strategic default, it also decreases the asset’s liquidation value. The monitoring carried out by the bank result in two problems: lock-in effects and the credible threat of liquidation. The Former is due to that the bank may threatening to liquidate even he knows that the project is good. The latter is due to that VIIthe bank have no incentives to liquidate even he knows that the project is bad. The paper analyzes the existence of lock-in effects in bank-borrower relationships due to the bank monitoring with dynamic game method, that is whether so-called bank hold-up exits. When the refinance is locked in to the initial bank for exogenous reasons, Bank hold-up exists if the borrower own less bargaining powers(the bank own more), otherwise it doesn’t exists. When the refinance is locked in for endogenous reasons, the hold-up always exists. If bank hold-up exists, the corporate can limit the bank’s information rent through allocating the priority to the common creditors. If bank hold-up doesn’t exist, bank monitoring brings about another problem, i.e. the credible threat of liquidation. To keep the liquidation threat, bank should have priority in mixed finance. There are two solutions to financial distress: the informal bankruptcy (where creditors have to pay their own lobbying expenses) and the formal bankruptcy (where creditors’ legal expenses are paid by the firm). The paper analyzes the contest game between the bank and the common creditors in the informal bankruptcy with contest theory. The analyses show that awarding seniority to banks and making the firm pay the legal expenses can minimize the total contest costs. The conclusion explains why it is reasonable for the court forces the firm to reimburse claimant’ fees. Key words: Bankruptcy Costs Bargaining Power Lock-in Effects Creditability of Liquidation Threat Lobbying/Litigation Costs 独独 创创 性性 声声 明明 本人声明所呈交的学位论文是我个人在导师指导下进行的研究工作及取得 的研究成果。

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