代理问题与企业理论中英laowen

wordAgency Problems and the Theory of the Firm 代理问题与企业理论摘要：This paper attempts to explain how the separation of security ownership and control, typical of large corporations, can be an efficient form of economic organization. 本文试图说明证劵所有权和控制权的别离对于经济组织可能是有效形式的机理，尤其对于大型企业而言。We first set aside the presumption that acorporation has owners in any meaningful sense.我们首先抛开企业在任何意义下一定有所有者的假定。The entrepreneur is also laid to rest, at least for the purposes of the large modern corporation.一定有企业家的假定也可以放在一边，至少对大型现代企业而言是的。 The two functions usually attributed to the entrepreneurmanagement and risk bearingare treated as naturally separate factors within the set of contracts called a firm. 通常认为认为企业家具有管理和风险承当这两种职能，而这两种职能通常被看做是企业的别离的要素。The firm is disciplined by petition from other firms, which forces the evolution of devices for efficiently monitoring the performance of the entire team and of its individual members. 企业总是有来自外部企业的竞争，这就不断促使对于整个团队和企业内部个人成员的表现监视机制不断进步。Individual participants in the firm, and in particular its managers, face both the discipline and opportunities provided by the markets for their services, both within and outside the firm. 企业的个人参与者，特别是对于管理者而言，在企业内部和外部都需要正视市场为他们的服务提供的准如此和机会。Economists have long been concerned with the incentive problems that arise when decision making in a firm is the province of managers who are not the firm's security holders.长期以来，经济学家就一直十分关注由一些不是企业证劵持有者的核心管理者进展企业决策所产生的激励问题。One oute has been the development of "behavioral" and "managerial" theories of the firm which reject the classical model of an entrepreneur, or owner-manager, who single-mindedly operates the firm to maximize profits, in favor of theories that focus more on the motivations of a manager who controls but does not own and who has little resemblance to the classical "economic man." 结果导致了企业行为理论和管理理论的开展，这些理论摒弃了古典模型中一个追求利润最大化的企业家或者企业所有者的假定，而赞同集中研究控制企业但不拥有企业的管理者这和古典理性人假定有很大的不同的激励问题。Examples of this approach are Baumol (1959), Simon (1959), Cyert and March (1963), and Williamson (1964).例如：鲍莫尔1959、西蒙1959、希尔特和马奇1963、威廉姆森1964。More recently the literature has moved toward theories that reject the classical model of the firm but assume classical forms of economic behavior on the part of agents within the firm.最近，关于企业代理者问题，经济文献倾向于摒弃古典企业模型而承受古典的经济行为的假定。 The firm is viewed as a set of contracts among factors of production, with each factor motivated by its self-interest.企业被看做是关于生产要素的一系列契约，这些要素都是受着自身利益最大化的激励。Because of its emphasis on the importance of rights in the organization established by contracts, this literature is characterized under the rubric "property rights." 因为强调契约确定的组织内权利的重要性，因此这些文献都出现在“产权理论的标题下。Alchian and Demsetz (1972) and Jensen and Meckling (1976) are the best examples. 最好的例子是阿尔奇安和德姆塞茨1972、杰森和梅克林1976。The antecedents of their work are in Coase (1937, 1960). 这些文献的先驱是科斯1976。The striking insight of Alchian and Demsetz (1972) and Jensen and Meckling (1976) is in viewing the firm as a set of contracts among factors of production. 阿尔奇安和德姆塞茨1972、杰森和梅克林1976将企业看作是在生产要素之间的一系列契约。In effect, the firm is viewed as a team whose members act from self-interest but realize that their destinies depend to some extent on the survival of the team in its petition with other teams.结果，企业被看做一个团队，在该团队内的成员都是追求自身利益最大化但是都意识到其自身的命运在某种程度上取决于企业与其他企业竞争的成功情况。 This insight, however, is not carried far enough. 然而，这种见解还不够。In the classical theory, the agent who personifies the firm is the entrepreneur who is taken to be both manager and residual risk bearer.在古典模型中，代理人是企业的化身，承当着管理者和剩余索取者的双重角色。 Although his title sometimes changes for example, Alchian and Demsetz call him "the employer"the entrepreneur continues to play a central role in the firm of the property-rights literature. 尽管称呼经常变换例如阿尔奇安和德姆塞茨将其称呼为“雇主，但是在产权文献中，企业家在企业中承当着核心的角色。As a consequence, this literature fails to explain the large modern corporation in which control of the firm is in the hands of managers who are more or less separate from the firm's security holders.结果，这些文献并不能够解释现代大型企业的情况，现代大型企业的控制权在管理者手中，这些管理者根本和企业的证券持有者是独立的。The main thesis of this paper is that separation of security ownership and control can be explained as an efficient form of economic organization within the "set of contracts" perspective. 本文的主要观点是,证券的控制权和所有权的别离可解释为经济组织的一种有效形式。We first set aside the typical presumption that a corporation has owners in any meaningful sense. 我们首先抛开企业在任何意义下一定有所有者的假定。The attractive concept of the entrepreneur is also laid to rest, at least for the purposes of the large modern corporation. 定有企业家的假定也可以放在一边，至少对大型现代企业而言是的。 Instead, the two functions usually attributed to the entrepreneur, management and risk bearing, are treated as naturally separate factors within the set of contracts called a firm.通常认为认为企业家具有管理和风险承当这两种职能，而这两种职能通常被看做是企业的别离的要素。The firm is disciplined by petition from other firms, which forces the evolution of devices for efficiently monitoring the performance of the entire team and of its individual members. 企业总是有来自外部企业的竞争，这就不断促使对